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Puli Thevar : The Ultimate Rebel Warrior

Long before Mangal Pandey who ignited the revolt of 1857, there was another Hindu , born in the land of the Raja Raja Cholan, who was the scourge of the enemies of Dharma. His name was Puli Thevar. The name Puli in Tamil means a Tiger, and this brave devotee of Mahadeva was one who lived to his name. Unmatched in skill of warfare, understanding of politics and full of fire this man was born to be a rebel. Not a rebel without cause, rather a rebel against Adharma.

Puli Thevar was born in the martial community of Hindu Marvars . After defeating a coalition of Islamists(the soldiers of the nawab of Arkot)-British forces, he was taken as a prisoner by deceit while on his way to the Sankaran Kovil temple. He was taken through the town streets, in a procession, by the muslim soldiers to shame him and left him alone in the sacred sanctum of the temple before they could take him to the courts for dispensing justice to the man who brought the mercenaries of Adharma to their knees.

What happened after is nothing less that divine intervention. Puli Thevar started singing hymns in praise of Mahadeva and all of sudden the sound of the cracking of handcuffs were heard by the soldiers camping outside the temple. Disturbed by the sounds the soldiers rushed inside the temple to see what happened, only to see broken handcuffs and chains with Puli Thevar nowhere in sight and never to be seen again by any mortal. Some say he was taken by the Lord himself to his abode……

Not being a man who would give up or prostrate in front of the British their Muslim lackeys, Puli Thevar was thoroughly maligned by the British historians as a man who never kept his word and was deceitful to the core. While these events occurred in late 1760, the truth of the events was never fully told by the Marxist historians of secular India. Therefore I shall try and tell the tale of the heroic exploits of this man who very few Hindus outside of Southern India have ever heard about.

Seeds of this rebellion were in 1736 when the Muslim Nawab of Arcot, Mohammed Aley, annexed the Hindu kingdom of Madura in present day Tamil Nadu. The Hindu Poligars (Chieftans and vassals to the king), being the descendants of the Cholas and Pandyas, were in no mood to accept the lordship of a usurper and Adharmika refused to compromise with him or pay taxes of homage to him.

Over the next  twenty years s confederation of seventy seven Poligars belonging to the Marvar community joint hands to defy the dictate of the usurper Mohammed Aley. The Poligars who lived in the vicinity of their hill fortress surrounded by forests and armed with ammunition, guns and traditional Hindu weapons attacked Mohammed’s forces at will defying him at each opportunity.

Scared of the might and defiance of the Hindu Poligars Mohammed the Nawab decided to find shelter in the British camp and beg them for help. The British eyeing an opportunity to grab Hindu lands that lay between Trichinapally and Cape Comorin decided to take nawab under their wing. This was a mistake that both the British and their lackey the nawab would go on to regret.

The British sent a large army commanded by Colonel Heron to assist their muslim vassal, Mohammed. On reaching the Poligar country this army started acting like street thugs, looting ordinary village folks, burning homes and even devastating the Hindu temples and shrines. Continuing his march forward Heron managed to used his skills of deceit to fight the Polingars into submission. The strongest Polingar was the Kattabomman of Panjalakurichi. He too surrendered and as he did not pay the full sum demanded by the British as tribute, he surrendered some of his close male relatives as collateral.

Assuming their victory was complete the British, under Heron, decided to head back to their base. However on their way back home Heron came up with an idea and the idea was to seek the submission of a minor Poligar of Nelkattumseval, his name was Puli Thevar. While the owner of a very small estate his influence amongst the Western Polingars was immense due to the fame of his abilities as an able administrator and considerable warrior.

 

What followed after this idea were a series of attacks, sieges and battles.

 

The First Siege: Nelkattumseval 1755 CE

No sooner had Puli Thevar refused the British demand for the payment of fief as an acceptance of their lordship over him, they launched an attack on Thevar. Puli Thevar’s informant in the British camp, the interpreter of Heron, sent him news that the British were short on supplies and did not have much heavy artillery. Hearing this Thevar decided to hold the British attack further.

Although Heron ordered a massive bombardment on Puli Thevar’s fort his forces couldn’t make much progress due to the thick walls of the fort. Forced to acknowledge that he couldn’t raid the fort, Heron  sent a message to the Puli asking for a paltry sum of rupees twenty thousand to be paid. However Puli who by now understood the British game replied thus

“ My estate does not have that much income….. besides  I know the value of  money and don’t expect me to pay you even a single rupee”

After facing such a humiliating defeat at the hands of the brave Marvar, the British ducked tail and retreated. However this defeat of the British ignited a fire of rebellion that would make the foreigners pay a very heavy price before it went out in a blaze of glory in 1763. The Polingars emboldened by their fellow Hindu’s victory soon joined hands against the British and started an all out revolt under the able leadership of Puli Thevar.

After the retreat of Heron was complete, Thevar gathered his Marwars and let them loose to seize the entire countryside. The Marwars who were the ablest of warriors, famed for their ferocity in war and predatory warfare started ambushing and looting the British units burning down the villages that had supported the British in their war effort and overran the entire countryside.

The Second Battle:  Kalakadu, 1755 CE

Understanding fully well that the British would not back down and would come back to attack his people again, Puli Thevar sent one of his generals to Travancore to win over the support of Maharajadhiraj Marathanda Varma who was the regent of Travancore. The general managed to convince His Majesty to support the Polingar confederacy lead by Puli Thevar and returned back with 4000 troops.

These troops were then added to his existing armies in order to fight the forces of Mahfuz Khan, the younger brother of Mohammed Aley and a British appointed governor of Madura. While Mahfuz Khan had a well equipped army, owing to the reinforcements received by the British , they were no match for Thevar’s much smaller army’s bravery or morale. These early victories boosted the morale of Thevar and he besieged the fort at Kalakadu. In order to end this siege Mahfuz Khan sent an entire division of cavalry. It was at this critical juncture that the Travancore forces had to retreat and head back home to control a major rebellion lead by Moplahs back in Travancore. With a large chunk of his men lost, Thevar knew that this battle was lost and so he retreated.

 

Second Siege of Nelkattumseval, 1755-1756 CE

Being very well aware that without the reinforcements from Travancore his army stood little chance against the gigantic cavalary of Mahfuz Khan, Thevar assembled all his troops and guns inside his fort complex at Nelkattumseval. Taking advantage of the situation the devious Khan sent his troops to devastate the Marvaras who had given him a hard time Kalakadu. The Muslim troops reestablished control of Arcot, which till then had been devastated by the Marvaras, and surrounded Puli Thevar in fort.

Thevar quickly asked his general to Mudemiah to engage Travancore once again, who by then had subdued the rebellion. The Travancore troops came out victorious, however knowing the sort of pain Puli Thevar could be Mahfuz went ahead with the siege of Thevar’s fort as he couldn’t afford to loose Puli.

Since this siege lasted quite some time Mahfuz’s troops ran short of supplies and begged the British for more. Seizing this opportunity, Puli Thevar instructed his crack troops to attack the British convoy. They more than obliged and looted the caravans and increasing Mahfuz Khan’s misery. Mahfuz who was by now in a state of shock decided to head back to his base in Tirunelveli in order to meet payroll and supply his troops.

Now a confiden
t Thevar decided that he must launch an assault to fully obliterate his Arcot-British enemies. For this purpose he persuaded the Eastern Poligar council to join hands with him so that they could together fight their common enemies. Sadly the strongest of the Eastern Poligar ,Kattabomman, still had his relatives as captives under the Nawab. Out of fear for loosing his loved ones he decided to opt out of this council, despite wanting to join hands with Puli Thevar. However all the Madura Poligars joined hands with Puli Thevar and ensured troops in case of a war. Thereafter Puli went on to ask the Poligars of Nattam tojoin him.

This confederacy of Polingars had a single point agenda which was to seize the ancient and strategic city of Madura, as that would be a symbolic restoration of pre-1736 order in addition to enabling them to oust the Anglo-Muslim garrisons and seize control the country south up to Cape Comorin. Their objective was to restore Hindu rule in what was once the kingdom of Madura.

British soon learnt of this preparation for war and they were alarmed by the sheer scale of ambitions of Thevar. They blamed Mahfuz’s incompetency for this dangerous situation and resolved to intervene directly. They dispatched 1000 sepoys under Yusuf Khan and also put Mafuz’s armies under Yusuf Khan’s orders.

Siege of Srivilliputtur, 1756

By the time these sepoys arrived, Puli Thevar had already started out on his victory march leading the Marwar confederate army. They had assembled in Nelkattumseval and were supposed to attack Madura in order to recapture it from the Mohammed Aley, the usurper. As they marched, they faced the fort of Srivilliputtur, which they had seize if the wished to march on to Madura.

This fort was under the lordship of one Abdul Rahim and he was confident that he could easily rout Puli Thevar and his marvars. Initially they engaged in an open battle with Thevar’s forces but found themselves to be no match for the Hindu skill and bravery and hence retreated back to their fortress. Puli Thevar had them surrounded so badly that the Arkot troops got demoralized and all of them, including Rahim Khan, fled to save their lives.

Seing this victory the rest of the Polingars appealed to Puli Thevar to change the original plan of to march from Nelkattumseval to Madura and instead seize Tirunelveli in the south and then move to Madura. Thevar agreed and this turned out to be a catastrophic decision. At that time Madura was held lightly by Arckot troops and a siege of on Madura would have passed the entire kingdom into Puli Thevar’s hands. As fate would have it Mahfuz Khan, with his strong troops in place, in Tirunelveli persuaded Kattabomman to support him in the war initiative and promised him land grants, riches, etc in return. As Kattabomman led the Eastern Poligars, war that began as a war of independence now became a civil war.

Battle of Tirunelveli, 1756

Despite the sabotage by his own Hindu brothers, The Polingars of the East, Thevar didn’t loose his resolve to meet the enemy forces in battle. Both sides had an equal number of men, totaling forty thousand, facing each other. However Mahfuz had an great advantage over the Poligars due to his superior calavry which was supported by his British masters. Not loosing hope and with the name of Mahadeva on his lips Puli Thevar and his brave twenty thousands left upon the enemy, however they were no match for the cavalry that supported Mahfuz. Had it not been for Kattabomman’s greed the Arcot troops, it would have been a funeral for Mahfuz and his troops and almost all of the entire the lands of Thamiz would have been in the hands of the Hindus. Sadly Thevar’s rank crumbled and he and his men returned back to Nelkattumseval.

After this catastrophe, Puli Thevar noticed a drop of morale among his fellow Poligars. He himself evaluated the situation and decided on a clever policy. Thevar sent out affirmations of loyalty to the Nawab and the British and even met the Tirtarappa Mudali, a fellow Hindu belonging to the Vellala community and Nawab’s new viceroy in Madura and paid him a large sum as tribute. Meanwhile, he let his Maravas loose once more to loot and devastate enemy held territories once more. When Arcot sepoys tried to control them, they looted Arcot camps as Arcot troops watched helpless. Thevar was determined that the British and the Nawab should never know any peace.

This came to the attention of Yusuf Khan, the military commander of the Mohammed Aley the Nawab’s trops. He ordered Thevar to return back to his fort at Nelkattumseva. Thevar instead met Kattabomman and rallied the Polingars again to fight the enemies of Dharma and the usurpers of Hindu lands. Puli Thevar managed to assemble ten thousand men within a short span of time proceeded towards a forest that was under Kattabomman’s protectorate and stretched to the outskirts of Tinnevelly.

Capture of Tirunelveli, 1756

Thevar being an astute militant commander decided to take this difficult route instead of a straight highway inorder to conceal the movement of his troops and to take the enemy by surprise.His plan was based in the information of a spy’z report that Mudali had camped his bulk force some twenty miles away where he anticipated Thevar;’s attack. Thevar decided to wait till nightfall before entering Tinnevelly. By dawn they had infiltrated into the town in small bands through unguarded points.

By sunrise Thevar and his men had seized the town of Tirunelveli. Mudali who had heard that he had been outwitted by Thevar, decided to assemble his troops at Palamkotta fort instead of attacking Tirunelveli. Thevar had no artillery so ordered his cavalry to encircle the fort and burn a large area around the fort to deprive them of supplies. His troops could not scale the fort walls because of gun-fire by Mudali’s troops; their only option is to wait and starve the enemy.

In the meantime Yusuf Khan who heard of the fall of Tirunelveli gathered his troops to attack Puli Thevar. On being informed of this Puli Thevar had to abandon the fort and move to Gangai Konda, north of Tirunelveli.

Thevar’s troops attacked from all sides but suffered huge losses as Yusuf Khan’s artillery took its toll on Thevar’s ranks. Thevar realised that the battle was lost and ordered a retreat. Thevar’s army split into three; the forces of Polygars under Thevar fled into the jungle, one of his generals with his horsemen went to Madura and another retreated towards Srivilliputtur.

Puli Thevar had not lost hope. He opened talks with agents of Mysore at Dindigul and offered them half a million (five lakh) rupees in exchange for military help. He also tried to persuade the corrupt officers of Mahfuz Khan to give up Cholavandan, a region through which the only road between Dindigal and Madura passed through a mountain defile. In order to tempt Mahfuz Khan to join his side, Thevar also tempted him with promise of high office in Mysore.

Thevar’s agenda was to out both the British and their underling the Nawab Mohammed Aley and restore the throne to the rightful Hindu heir of ruling dynasty of Madura. The British got a scent of his plans for the formation of a third confederacy and the dispatched a huge force under Yusuf Khan and Mudali.

A third of this force was posted in Tirunelveli and another third was aseembled in the fort of Palamkotta. Yusuf Khan’s strategy in this battle was to overwhelm Thevar into submission by excessive use of force so that the rest of the Poligars would be dissuaded to join forces with him. Yusuf sent his envoys to Puli Thevar’s camp to invite him for negotiations.

Thevar accepted the invitation and sent three hundred of his marvars to the Muslim camp in order to conduct negotiations, which failed. As result Yusuf decided to send Alagappa  to settle matters with Thevar. Yusuf Khan’s envoy offered large lands as grants to Puli Thevar if we gave an affirmative to the peace deal. Thevar was too shrewd to fall for these lies, as he was fully aware of the lying and deceit nature enshrined in the ethos of the enemy. However instead of refusing the offer outright what he did was was to send his main army to join his generals and the sent small attack teams to go and ravage the enemy territories west of Tirunelveli, intending the negotiations to fail.

Soon Thevar got what he wanted as the nawab’s men killed some of the envoys he had sent to the Arckot camp for negotiations, accusing them of stealing their horses and oxen. Thevar used this an excuse to launch a full fledged attack on the Nawab.In the meantime Mahfuz Khan ,being unscrupulous character, understoof that his existence depended on the good will of Puli Thevar so he came to Nelkettuseval with troops by the end of 1756. Several of the NAwab;s officers also revolted. However since Mahfuz Khan didn’t have the stomach for more battle he was chased away by the British after they left leaving the Nawab in charge.This was exactly the opportunity that Puli Thevar was looking for as he had completed his preparations for the siege of Madura by that time and without the British reinforcements Mohammed Aley the nawab’s forces wouldn’t be able to hold out for long.

Second Capture of Tirunelveli, 1756

Maravan History - pandaravanniyanIn early 1757, Thevar along with Mahfuz Khan and supported by many Polygars marched towards Tirunelveli for the third time at the head of an army of 10,000 men. They camped near Tirunelveli but did not attempt to capture the town. Thevar remembered well what would happen if a largely primitive force engaged with the well-equipped army which held Tirunelveli.

Instead, in an effort to seize the country-side, Thevar sent messages to Mudalis, or tax collectors, that from now on he was in charge and that they must pay tax to him.Talks were opened with the Raja of Travancore to persuade him into lending support the war efforts of the Poligar confederacy in exchange for which Thevar promised him those territories on which Raja of Travancore coveted.

Soon the troops that held Tirunelveli marched to Madura and Mahfuz Khan marched into the abandoned town. Mahfuz was so intoxicated by this success-in reality only luck-that he on his own, ordered his men to assault the nearby fort of Palamkotta; his men suffered staggering losses. The commandant of Palayamkotta enticed Kattabomman, the rank opportunist to support him in exchange for lucrative land grants.

Kattabomman’s troops routed Mahfuz’s troops who camped some distance away from the fort. After this Kattabomman retreated but Yusuf Khan came to the scene. Mahfuz Khan fled the scene to Nelkettumseval to join Thevar, who had left much earlier as he understood that plans were not working as he had envisaged.

In the summer of 1758, Puli Thevar, for the fourth time, was ready to clash with the British and Nawab. Puli Thevar was supported by Poligars of Wadagiri, Kotaltava, Naduvakurichi and Sorandai. Ettaiyapuram Poligar also joined Thevar’s confederacy and soon confederates persuaded the Polygar of Settur to join them.

Stand At Settur & Aftermath, 1759

Puli Thevar camped his troops inside the Settur fort, only 15 miles from Srivilliputtur and their joint force ravaged the enemy-held surrounding zone. Yusuf Khan besieged the Settur fort, whose Poligar lost nerve and expelled Thevar’s troops, paid a fine and surrendered.

Thevar’s troops re-grouped and they seized all enemy outposts from Nelkettumseval to Tirunelveli and massacred the garrisons they overran. This great success elated Thevar and his confederates and they attacked and captured the Uttumalai fort held by a British lackey Poligar and prepared to capture Palamkotta and Tirunelveli.

The arrival of Yusuf Khan’s troops at Srivilliputtur checked their progress. Instead of an open fight, Thevar wisely chose to strengthen the chain of posts he had captured. He also sent troops to Nelkettumseval to prepare for defense and spread out his troops around Yusuf’s army in order to harass Yusuf’s troops. Yusuf had far greater troops and soon he recaptured all the outposts seized by Thevar and then he marched and destroyed much of Poligar country by fire and sword. But even so his attempt to reduce Poligars went only slowly as Poligars retreated into their strong impregnable forts. Soon Yusuf was forced to retreat because of orders from British authorities.

In 1759, Thevar took revenge as he marched towards Palamkotta and the garrison troops came out and fought Thevar’s men. Thevar devastated his enemy’s force in open field, but retired-as he knew that it would be nearly impossible to storm a well-defended fort. The incident was an embarrassment and shock to the British. Thevar’s troops overran the countryside from Nattam to Travacore also. Enemy garrisons were safe only in their forts. They once more deputized Yusuf Khan to crush Puli Thevar. Thevar was worried that Mahfuz Khan might switch sides as he was a rank opportunist and so kept him under close watch.

Second Struggle with Yusuf Khan

The pro-British Kattabomman died and the new Kattabomman loathed them. He, as the leader of Eastern Poligars, pledged support to Puli Thevar, the undisputed leader of Western Poligars. This union was aimed to meet the threat of Yusuf Khan.

Yusuf Khan could have been driven back easily if he had to face so mighty a confederacy alone. Some Poligars were eager to collaborate with enemy. Yusuf came into Poligar country with only 1000 men but soon his army grew to 4000 with support from these fallen Hindu Poligars. Even so he was not ready.

He waited for reinforcements to come. His strategy, till he received reinforcements, was to prevent the armies of Puli Thevar and Kattabomman from joining. He sent a heavily armed force into Ettaiyapuram with this task-they were to fight and block Eastern Polygars’ troops so that he could deal with Puli Thevar and men separately.

Once fully prepared, Yusuf Khan marched on. His force captured the strategic fort of Kollarpetti and reached Tirunelveli. Mahfuz Khan requested a pardon from Yusuf Khan and a jagir for himself if he left Thevar’s camp. Yusuf Khan assured him that his demands would be met. Puli Thevar surprised an enemy army at Sorandai and massacred and looted it. Yusuf immediately sent another force to retaliate, but Thevar had left by that time. Travancore troops began incursions into lands between Cape Comorin and Kalakadu. The Maravas of Puli Thevar and his allies ravaged all of Tamil country south of Tirunelveli and Yusuf who had to deal with three enemies, appeared in dire straits.

An idiotic action by the Poligar of Wadagiri turned the tables. He had let his Maravas repeatedly plunder the territories of the Travancore Raja who was his neighbor too. The Maharaja of Travancore, angry at this policy, began to have second thoughts. Yusuf Khan exploited this by opening talks with the Raja of Travancore. This talk was to have fatal consequences. The Raja of Travancore agreed to side with Yusuf, if he left the Poligar confederacy. The Raja sent a large force of musketeers to join with Yusuf’s troops-altogether 20,000 men marched towards the fort of Wadagiri, and Polygar had to escape as he could not withstand them for more than a day.

The Polygar of Wadagiri took refuge with Puli Thevar at Nelkattumseval. Puli Thevar himself was worried as the most powerful Western Polygar-Wadagiri Polygar was finished. He learnt that the French had sent a letter to Mahfuz Khan which stated that soon the English would be finished and that Mahfuz would be crowned as Nawab after the present Nawab, an English puppet, was ousted. Thevar exploited this situation.

He sent a message to Travancore Raja about this letter and argued that since the French will win in the end, what would Travancore gain if they allied with the English, whose man was Yusuf? Thevar offered that if Travancore Raja side with them, he would let Raja have those parts of Tirunelveil of his own choice.

The Travancore Raja told Yusuf Khan of this communication of Puli Thevar. The Raja of Travancore argued that since Thevar had offered him so much, he will side with Yusuf only if Yusuf ceded the land between Cape Comorin and Kalakadu that Nawab had denied to Travancore. He also threatened Yusuf that if he supported Thevar that would mean the end of Nawab’s ambitions in country south of Tirunelveli-which indeed was a real threat.

The Dutch seizure of artillery sent by English meant for Yusuf Khan, opened the prospect of war with Dutch in Tuticorin (Toothukudi). Yusuf relented and ceded the territories demanded by the Raja and so Puli Thevar’s attempt to win this Raja ended in failure. If the Raja had allied with Thevar, the British conquest of South India might have been delayed by years and even decades. Thus Yusuf Khan was saved because by that time, Maravas across southern Tamil Nadu had flocked to Thevar’s fort to fight for their hero. It was beyond the capacity of Yusuf Khan to overpower so great a host alone, but with help from Travancore assured, he was confident. Soon, Travancore troops and Yusuf Khan’s units jointly captured the fort of Isvara Thevar, a vassal of Puli Thevar. Isvara Thevar and his men retreated to Nelkettumseval, but this victory had exhausted his ammunition and he was delayed in his next move. As they waited, a force of 6000 Maravas launched a surprise raid on the Travacore camp and killed several troops. But by time Yusuf Khan marched with his men, Marava force had retreated.

Siege of Vasdevanellur, 1759–1760

In December, 1759, Yusuf besieged fort of Vasudevanellur with his allied troops after he received a large stock of ammunition. This fort belonged to Puli Thevar and was his second strongest fort, located on top of a mountain range and was covered by a vast forest on all sides.

Puli Thevar kept 1000 men in the fort and spread out the rest of his force in the forest that surrounded the fort. These troops raided enemy camps, sniped and ambushed scattered units of Yusuf’s armies and they also disrupted his effort to build a massive construction for artillery batteries it took three weeks for Yusuf to complete the construction; relentless bombardment caused Yusuf to lose some of his heavy artillery and most of his ammunition. He had breached the wall of this mighty fort and he unwisely decided to engage his troops in a hand to hand combat with Thevar’s soldiers.

Puli Thevar was at this time not at Vasudevanellur, he was at his headquarters of Nelkattumseval. As both sides prepared for the final struggle for Vasudevanellur, Thevar collected 3000 of his ablest Maravas and led them in a night march from Nelkattumseval to Vasudevanellur.

Once he approached Vasudevanellur’s neighborhood, Thevar led his troops through the forest below the fort to avoid detection by enemy and sprang into a surprise attack on Yusuf Khan’s camp. Thevar’s troops devastated the enemy camp and Yusuf Khan threw a large force into the fray to tilt the balance. The Maravas, intoxicated by their success, fought with great ardour. In the meantime, those Maravas who had concealed themselves in forests and ambushed Yusuf Khan’s troops for the last 3–4 weeks came out of the woods and began to attack Yusuf Khan’s battery positions and the enemy infantry that was trying to move into the fort through the breach.

The Maravas were repeatedly beaten back by Yusuf’s men, but each time they returned to the attacks. These Maravas worked together with the garrison to check the enemy advance into the fort and they were successful. The Maravas then returned to the woods below the fort and lay in wait for a renewed enemy attack in night. But Yusuf Khan was nearly exhausted of his ammunition and he foresaw the catastrophe if he stood before the fort without ammunition.

The following day, Yusuf Khan and Travancore troops retreated and they split into two-Travancore troops went home while Yusuf and his men went to Tirunelveli. Yusuf Khan no longer had the ability to launch an offensive into Puli Thevar’s country so he stayed at Tirunelveli and posted his men at key points to limit Puli Thevar’s raids. For the time being his grand plan to crush this turbulent Polygar was shelved.

Thevar did not leave Yusuf Khan in peace. His Maravas ravaged Tirunelveli country so much that Yusuf Khan himself realised that he could not crush them by force so he bribed many of them to join his side. Yusuf soon found himself at war with Mysore and Dutch, which bought Thevar time. Yusuf Khan crushed a force of 3000 men sent by Kattabomman. Thevar learnt that the French were besieged in Pondicherry by the English and that Mahfuz Khan had gone over to Nawab, but his Maravas ravaged lands held by Yusuf Khan so much that he soon deployed the bulk of his force in front of Nelkettumseval in order to force the Maravas to abandon his lands.

He bought several pieces of heavy artillery but had no ammunition and sent a message to the British camp in Trichinopoly to send him ammunition. As he awaited, Puli Thevar launched a lightning raid on Yusuf’s camp and after killing and wounding several of Yusuf’s men retreated.

Finally after a long and ardous battle Puli Thevar was captured on his way to pilgrimage, and the rest as they say is the miracle of Mahadeva.

Puli Thevar’s desecendants are spread all over present day Tamil Nadu in the southern part. Most of them are located around the region called as nel kattan sevval (the place which doesn’t pay rice tribute) which before Puli Thevar’s war and after the Mohammaed Aley’s taking over Madura was known as Nel kattum sevval  (The place that pays the rice tribute)
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Legendary Battles

The Epic 27 Year War That Saved Hinduism


Shivaji was the greatest Hindu king that India had produced within the last thousand years; one who was the very incarnation of lord Siva, about whom prophecies were given out long before he was born; and his advent was eagerly expected by all the great souls and saints of Maharashtra as the deliverer of the Hindus from the hands of the Mlecchas, and as one who succeeded in the reestablishment of Dharma which had been trampled underfoot by the depredations of the devastating hordes of the Moghals”   – Swami Vivekananda

 

Schoolchildren in India learn a very specific blend of Indian history. This school version of history is stripped of all the vigor and pride. The story of Indian civilization spans thousands of years. However for the most part the schoolbook version dwells on the freedom struggle against British and important role played in there by the Indian National Congress. We learn each and every movement of Gandhi and Nehru, but not even a passing reference is made to hundreds of other important people and events.

My objection is not to the persons Gandhi or Nehru. They were great men. However the attention they get and the exposure their political views and ideology gets is rather disproportionate.

And thus it comes no surprise to me that rarely we talk about an epic war that significantly altered the face of Indian subcontinent. The war that can be described the mother of all wars in India. Considering the average life expectancy that time was around 30 years, this war of 27 years lasted almost the lifespan of an entire generation. The total number of battles fought was in hundreds. It occurred over vast geographical expanse spanning four biggest states of modern India- Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka. For time, expanse and human and material cost, this  war has no match in Indian history.

Intro

It started in 1681 with the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb’s invasion of Maratha empire. It ended in 1707 with Aurangzeb’s death. Aurangzeb threw everything he had in this war. He lost it all.

It’s tempting to jump into the stories of heroics, but what makes the study of war more interesting is the understanding of politics behind it. Every war is driven by politics. Rather war is just one of the means to do politics. This war was not an exception.

Shivaji’s tireless work for most of his life had shown fruits by the last quarter of seventeenth century. He had firmly established Marathas as power in Deccan. He built hundreds of forts in Konkan and Sahyadris and thus created a defense backbone. He also established strong naval presence and controlled most of the Western ports barring few on end of Indian peninsula. Thus tightening the grip on trade routes of Deccan sultanates, he strangled their  weapons import from Europe and horses import from Arabian traders.  These Sultanates launched several campaigns against Shivaji, but failed to stop him.

On the Northern front, several Rajput kings had accepted to be the vassals of Mughals. Aurangzeb had succeeded to the throne after brutal killing of his brothers and imprisonment of his father. With Rajput resistance mostly subsided and the southern sultanates weakened, it was only matter of time before Marathas were in his cross-hair.

[quote]‘The death of Shivaji was the mere beginning of Maratha history. He founded a Hindu principality-it had yet to grow into a Hindu Empire. This was all done after the death of Shivaji. The real epic opens as soon as Shivaji, after calling into being the great forces that had to act it up, disappears from the scene. ‘ ...Vināyak Dāmodar Sāvarkar[/quote]

Shivaji’s death

At the time of Shivaji’s death in 1680, Maratha empire spanned an area far more than the current state of Maharashtra and had taken firm roots. But it was surrounded by enemies from all sides.  Portuguese on northern Coast and Goa, British in Mumbai, Siddies in Konkan and remaining Deccan sultanates in Karnataka posed limited challenge each, but none of them was capable of taking down the Marathas alone. Mughal empire with Aurangzeb at its helm was the most formidable foe.

For the most part, Aurangzeb was a religious fanatic. He had distanced Sikhs and Rajputs because of his intolerant policies against Hindus. After his succession to the throne, he had made life living hell for Hindus in his kingdom. Taxes like Jizya tax were imposed on Hindus. No Hindu could ride in Palanquin. Hindu temples were destroyed and abundant forcible conversions took place. Aurangzeb unsuccessfully tried to impose Sharia, the Islamic law. This disillusioned Rajputs and Sikhs resulting in their giving cold shoulder to Aurangzeb in his Deccan campaign.

Thus in September of  1681, after settling his dispute with the royal house of Mewar, Aurangzeb began his journey to Deccan to kill the Maratha confederacy that was not even 50 years old. On his side, the Mughal king had enormous army numbering half a million soldiers, a number more than three times that of the Maratha army. He had plentiful support of artillery, horses, elephants. He also brought huge wealth in royal treasuries. Teaming up with Portuguese, British ,Siddis, Golkonda and Bijapur Sultanates he planned to encapsulate Marathas from all sides and to form a deadly death trap. To an outsider, it would seem no-brainer to predict the outcome of such vastly one sided war. It seemed like the perfect storm headed towards Maratha confederacy.

Enormous death and destruction followed in Deccan for what seemed like eternity. But what happened at the end would defy all imaginations and prove every logic wrong. Despite lagging in resources on all fronts, it would be the Marathas who triumphed. And at the expense of all his treasure, army, power and life, it would be the invading emperor who learned a very costly lesson, that the will of people to fight for their freedom should never be underestimated.


Timeline – Marathas under King Sambhaji (1680 to 1689):


Image result for King SambhajiAfter the death of Shivaji in 1680, a brief power struggle ensued in the royal family. Finally Sambhaji became the king. By this time Aurangzeb had finished his North missions and was pondering a final push in Deccan to conquer all of the India.

In 1681 sambhaji attacked Janjira, but his first attempt failed. In the same time one of the Aurangzeb’s generals, Hussein Ali Khan , attacked Northern Konkan. Sambhaji left janjira and attacked Hussein Ali Khan and pushed him back to Ahmednagar. By this time monsoon of 1682 had started. Both sides halted their major military operations. But Aurangzeb was not sitting idle. He tried to sign a deal with Portuguese to allow mughal ships to harbor in Goa. This would have allowed him to open another supply route to Deccan via sea. The news reached sambhaji. He attacked Portuguese territories and pushed deep inside Goa. But Voiceroy Alvor was able to defend Portuguese headquarters.

By this time massive Mughal army had started gathering on the borders of Deccan. It was clear that southern India was headed for one big conflict.Sambhaji had to leave Portuguese expedition and turn around. In late 1683, Aurangzeb moved to Ahmednagar. He divided his forces in two and put his two princes, Shah Alam and Azam Shah, in charge of each division. Shah alam was to attack South Konkan via Karnataka border while Azam Shah would attack Khandesh and northern Maratha territory. Using pincer strategy, these two divisions planned to circle Marathas from South and North and isolate them.

The beginning went quite well. Shah Alam crossed Krishna river and entered Belgaum. From there he entered Goa and started marching north via Konkan. As he pushed further,he was continuously harassed by Marathas. They ransacked his supply chains and reduced his forces to starvation. Finally Aurangzeb sent Ruhulla Khan for his rescue and brought him back to Ahmednagar. The first pincer attempt failed.

After 1684 monsoon, Aurangzeb’s another general Sahabuddin Khan directly attacked the Maratha capital, fort Raygad. Maratha commanders successfully defended Raygad. Aurangzeb sent Khan Jehan for help, but Hambeerrao Mohite, Commander-in-Chief of Maratha army, defeated him in a fierce battle at Patadi. Second division of Maratha army attacked Sahabuddin Khan at Pachad, inflicting heavy losses on Mughal army.

In early 1685, Shah Alam attacked South again via Gokak- Dharwar route. But Sambhaji’s forces harassed him continuously on the way and finally he had to give up and thus failed to close the loop second time.

In april 1685 Aurangzeb rehashed his strategy. He planned to consolidate his power in the South by taking expeditions to Goalkonda and Bijapur. Both were Shia muslim rulers and Aurangzeb was no fond of them. He broke his treaties with both empires and attacked them. Taking this opportunity Marathas launched offensive on North coast and attacked Bharuch. They were able to evade the mughal army sent their way and came back with minimum damage.

On Aurangzeb’s new Southern front, things were proceeding rather smoothly. Bijapur fell in September 1686. King Sikandar Shah was captured and imprisoned. Goalkonda agreed to pay huge ransom. But after receiving the money, Aurangzeb attacked them in blatant treachery. Soon Goalkonda fell as well. King Abu Hussein of Goalkonda was captured and met the same fate as Sikandar Shah.

Marathas had tried to win mysore through diplomacy. Kesopant Pingle, (Moropant Pingle’s brother) was running negotiations, but the fall of Bijapur to mughals turned the tides and Mysore was reluctant to join Marathas. Still Sambhaji successfully courted several Bijapur sardars to join Maratha army.

After fall of Bijapur and Goalkonda, Aurangzeb turned his attention again to his main target – Marathas. First few attempts proved unsuccessful to make a major dent. But in Dec 1688 he had his biggest jackpot. Sambhaji was captured due to treachery at Sangmeshwar. Aurangzeb gave him option of converting to Islam, which he refused. Upon refusal, Aurangzeb, blinded by his victories, gave Sambhaji the worst treatment he could ever give to anyone.Sambhaji was paraded on donkey. His tongue was cut, eyes were gorged out. His body was cut into pieces and fed to dogs.

There were many people who did not like Sambhaji and thus were sympathetic to Mughals. But this barbaric treatment made everyone angry. Maratha generals gathered on Raygad. The decision was unanimous. All peace offers were to be withdrawn. Mughals would be repelled at all costs. Rajaram succeeded as the next king. He began his reign by a valiant speech on Raygad. All Maratha generals and councilmen united under the flag of new king, and thus began the second phase of the epic war.


“Whenever Mughal horses used to refuse to go to the water to drink water, it was feared they had seen Santaji and Dhanaji”
Kafi Khan  Mughal court historian

27 Years War TimeLine – Marathas under King Rajaram (1689 to 1700)

To Aurangzeb, the Marathas seemed all but dead by end of 1689. But this would prove to be almost a fatal blunder. In March 1690, the Maratha commanders, under the leadership of Santaji Ghorpade launched the single most daring attack on mughal army. They not only attacked the army, but sacked the tent where the Aurangzeb himself slept. Luckily Aurangzeb was elsewhere but his private force and many of his bodyguards were killed.

This positive development was followed by a negative one for Marathas. Raigad fell to treachery of Suryaji Pisal. Sambhaji’s queen, Yesubai and their son, Shahu, were captured.

Mughal forces, led by Zulfikar Khan, continued this offensive further South. They attacked fort Panhala. The Maratha killedar of Panhala gallantly defended the fort and inflicted heavy losses on Mughal army. Finally Aurangzeb himself had to come. Panhala surrendered.

Maratha ministers had foreseen the next Mughal move on Vishalgad. They made Rajaram leave Vishalgad for Jinji, which would be his home for next seven years. Rajaram  travelled South under escort of Khando Ballal and his men. The queen of Bidnur,  gave them supplies and free passage.  Harji Mahadik’s division met them near Jinji and guarded them to the fort. Rajaram’s queen was escorted out of Maharashtra by Tungare brothers.  She was taken to Jinji by different route. Ballal and Mahadik tirelessly worked to gather the scattered diplomats and soldiers. Jinji became new capital of Marathas. This breathed new life in Maratha army.

Aurangzeb was frustrated with Rajaram’s successful escape. His next move was to keep most of his force in Maharashtra and dispatch a small force to keep Rajaram in check. But the two Maratha generals, Santaji ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav would prove more than match to him.

They first attacked and destroyed the force sent by Aurangzeb to keep check on Rajaram, thus relieving the immediate danger. Then they joined Ramchandra Bavadekar in Deccan. Bavdekar, Vithoji Bhosale and Raghuji Chavan had reorganized most of the Maratha army after defeats at Panhala and Vishalgad.

In late 1691, Bavdekar, Pralhad Niraji , Santaji ,Dhanaji and several Maratha sardars met in Maval region and reformed the strategy. Aurangzeb had taken four major forts in Sahyadrais and was sending Zulfikar khan to subdue the fort Jinji. So according to new Maratha plan, Santaji and Dhanaji would launch offensives in the East to keep rest of the Mughal forces scattered. Others would focus in Maharashtra and would attack a series of forts around Southern Maharashtra and Northern Karnataka to divide Mughal won territories in two, thereby posing significant challenge to enemy supply chains. Thanks to Shivaji’s vision of building a navy, Marathas could now extend this divide into the sea, checking any supply routes from Surat to South.

The execution began. In early 1692 Shankar Narayan and Parshuram Trimbak recaptured Rajgad and Panhala. In early 1693 Shankar Narayan and Bhosale captured Rohida. Sidhoji Gujar took Vijaydurg. Soon Parshuram Trimbak took Vishalgad. Kanhoji Angre, a young Maratha Naval officer that time, took fort Kolaba.

While this was in work, Santaji and Dhanaji were launching swift raids on Mughal armies on East front. This came as a bit of surprise to Aurangzeb. In spite of losing one King and having second king driven away, Marathas were undaunted and actually were on offensive. From Khandesh, Ahmednagar to Bijapur to Konkan and Southern Karnataka, Santaji and Dhanaji wrecked havoc. Encouraged by the success, Santaji and Dhanaji hatched new action plan to attack Mughal forces near Jinji. Dhanaji Jadhav attacked Ismail Khan and defeated him near Kokar. Santaji Ghorpade attacked Ali Mardan Khan at the base of Jinji and captured him. With flanks cleared, both joined hands and laid a second siege around the Mughal siege at Jinji.

Julfikar khan, who was orchestrating Jinji siege, left the siege on Aurangzeb’s orders and marched back. Santaji followed him to North, but was defeated by Julfikar Khan. Santaji then diverted his forces to Bijapur. Aurangzeb sent another general Kasim Khan to tackle Santaji. But Santaji attacked him with a brilliant military maneuver near Chitaldurg and forced him take refuge in Dunderi fort. The fort was quickly sieged by Santaji and the siege only ended when most of the Mughal soldiers starved and Kasim Khan committed suicide. Aurangzeb sent Himmat Khan to reinforce Kasim Khan. Himmat khan carried heavy artillery. So Santaji lured him in a trap in the forest near Dunderi. A sudden, ambush style attack on Mughals was followed by a fierce battle. The battle ended when when Himmat Khan was shot in head and died. All his forces routed and Santaji confiscated a big cache of weapons and ammunition.

By now, Aurangzeb had the grim realization that the war he began was much more serious than he thought. He consolidated his forces and rethought his strategy. He sent an ultimatum to Zulfikar khan to finish Jinji business or be stripped of the titles. Julfikar khan tightened the Siege. But Rajaram fled and was safely escorted to Deccan by Dhanaji Jadhav and  Shirke brothers. Haraji Mahadik’s son took the charge of Jinji and bravely defended Jinji against Julfikar khan and Daud khan till January of 1698. This gave Rajaram ample of time to reach Vishalgad.

Jinji: fortressJinji fell, but it did a big damage to the Mughal empire. The losses incurred in taking Jinji far outweighed the gains. The fort had done its work. For seven years the three hills of Jinji had kept a large contigent of mughal forces occupied. It had eaten a deep hole into Mughal resources. Not only at Jinji, but the royal treasury was bleeding everywhere and was already under strain.

Marathas would soon witness an unpleasant development, all of their own making. Dhanaji Jadhav and Santaji Ghorpade had a simmering rivalry, which was kept in check by the councilman Pralhad Niraji. But after Niraji’s death, Dhanaji grew bold and attacked Santaji. Nagoji Mane, one of Dhanaji’s men, killed Santaji. The news of Santaji’s death greatly encouraged Aurangzeb and Mughal army.

But by this time Mughals were no longer the army they were feared before. Aurangzeb, against advise of several of his experienced generals, kept the war on. It was much like Alexander on the borders of Taxila.

The Marathas again consolidated and the new Maratha counter offensive began. Rajaram made Dhanaji the next commander in chief. Maratha army was divided in three divisions. Dhanaji would himself lead the first division. Parshuram Timbak lead the second and Shankar Narayan lead the third. Dhanaji Jadhav defeated a large mughal force near Pandharpur. Shankar Narayan defeated Sarja Khan in Pune. Khanderao Dabhade, who lead a division under Dhanaji, took Baglan and Nashik. Nemaji Shinde, another commander with Shankar Narayan, scored a major victory at Nandurbar.

Enraged at this defeats, Aurangzeb himself took charge and launched another counter offensive. He laid siege to Panhala and attacked the fort of Satara. The seasoned commander, Prayagji Prabhu defended Satara for a good six months, but surrendered in April of 1700, just before onset of Monsoon. This foiled Aurangzeb’s strategy to clear as many forts before monsoon as possible.

In March of 1700, another bad news followed Marathas. Rajaram took his last breath. His queen Tarabai, who was also daughter of the gallant Maratha Commander-in-Chief Hambeerrao Mohite, took charge of Maratha army. Daughter of a braveheart, Tarabai proved her true mettle for the next seven years. She carried the struggle on with equal valor. Thus began the phase 3, the last phase of the prolonged war, with Marathas under the leadership of Tarabai.

The signs of strains were showing in Mughal camp in late 1701. Asad Khan, Julfikar Khan’s father, counselled Aurangzeb to end the war and turn around. This expedition had already taken a giant toll, much larger than originally planned, on Mughal empire. And serious signs were emerging that the 200 years old Mughal empire was crumbling and was in the middle of a war that was not winnable.

Mughals were bleeding heavily from treasuries. But  Aurangzeb kept pressing the war on.  When Tarabai took charge, Aurangzeb had laid siege to the fort of Parli (Sajjangad). Parshuram Trimbak defended the fort until monsoon and retreated quietly at the break of monsoon.The mughal army was dealt heavy loss by flash floods in the rivers around. These same tactics were followed by Marathas at the next stop of Aurangzeb, Panhala. Similar tactic was followed even for Vishalgad.

By 1704, Aurangzeb had Torana and Rajgad. He had won only a handful forts in this offensive, but he had spent several precious years. It was slowly dawning to him that after 24 years of constant war, he was no closer to defeating Marathas than he was the day he began.

The final Maratha counter offensive gathered momentum in North. Tarabai proved to be a valiant leader once again. One after another Mughal provinces fell in north. They were not in position to defend as the royal treasuries had been sucked dry and no armies were left in tow. In 1705, two Maratha army factions crossed Narmada. One under leadership of Nemaji Shinde hit as deep North as Bhopal. Second under the leadership of Dabhade struck Bharoch and West. Dabhade with his eight thousand men,attacked and defeated Mahomed khan’s forces numbering almost fourteen thousand. This left entire Gujarat coast wide open for Marathas. They immediately tightened their grip on Mughal supply chains.

In Maharashtra, Aurangzeb grew despondent. He started negotiations with Marathas, but cut abruptly and marched on a small kingdom called Wakinara. Naiks at Wakinara traced their lineage to royal family of Vijaynagar empire. They were never fond of Mughals and had sided with Marathas. Dhanaji marched into Sahyadris and won almost all the major forts back in short time. Satara and Parali forts were taken by Parshuram Timbak. Shankar Narayan took Sinhgad. Dhanaji then turned around and took his forces to Wakinara. He helped the Naiks at Wakinara sustain the fight. Naiks fought very bravely. Finally Wakinara fell, but the royal family of Naiks successfully escaped with least damage.

Aurangzeb had now given up all hopes and was now planning retreat to Burhanpur. Dhanaji Jadhav again fell on him and in swift and ferocious attack and dismantled the rear guard of his imperial army. Zulfikar Khan rescued the emperor and they successfully reached Burhanpur.

Aurangzeb witnessed bitter fights among his sons in his last days. Alone, lost, depressed, bankrupt, far away from home, he died sad death on 3rd March 1707. “I hope god will forgive me one day for my disastrous sins”, were his last words.

Thus ended a prolonged and grueling period in history of India. The Mughal kingdom fragmented and disintegrated soon after. And Deccan saw rise of a new sun, the Maratha empire.


[quote]” What some call the Muslim period in Indian history, was in reality a continuous war of occupiers against resisters, in which the Muslim rulers were finally defeated in the 18th century”  Dr Koenraad Elst[/quote]


Reflection: Strategical Analysis:

Mughal ArmyIn this war, Aurangzeb’s army totaled more than 500,000 in number (compared to total Maratha army in the ballpark of 150,000). With him he carried huge artillery, cavalry, muskettes, ammunition and giant wealth from royal treasuries to support this quest. This war by no means a fair game when numbers are considered.

The main features of Aurangzeb’s strategy were :-

Use of overwhelming force to demoralize the enemy –

This tactic had proved successful in Aurangzeb’s other missions. Thus he used this even in Maharashtra. On several occasions giant Mughal contigents were used to lay siege to a fort or capture a town.

Meticulously planned sieges to the forts

Aurangzeb knew that the forts in Sahyadri formed backbone of Maratha defense. His calculation was to simply lay tight siege to the fort, demoralizing and starving the people inside and finally making them surrender the fort.

Fork or pincer movements using large columns of infantry and cavalry –

With large number of infantry and cavalry, pincer could have proved effective and almost fatal against Marathas

Marathas had one advantage on their side, geography. They milked this advantage to the last bit. Their military activities were planned considering the terrain and the weather.

The main features of Maratha strategy were :-

Combined offensive-defensive strategy –

Throughout the war, Marathas never stopped their offensive. This served two purposes. The facts that Maratha army was carrying out offensive attacks in Mughal land suddenly made them psychologically equals to Mughals launching attack in Maratha land, even though Mughals were a much bigger force. This took negative toll on Mughal morale and boosted morale of their own men. Secondly, these offensive attacks in terms of quick raids often heavily damaged enemy supply chains taking toll on Mughal army. The forts formed backbone of Maratha defense. Thanks to Shivaji, the every fort had provision of fresh water. The total forts numbered almost 300 and this large number proved major headache to Aurangzeb.


Strategic fort defense –

Marathas had one big advantage on their side. They were the expert in fort warfare. The game of defense using forts had two components.

First component was the right play of the strategic forts . In modern warfare, you have some strategic assets like aircraft carrier, presence of which needs a substantial change of plans on your enemy side.  And then there are tactical assets, like tanks and large guns, which matter from battle to battle, but can be effectively countered by your enemy without making big plan changes. Similarly there are strategic forts, like Raigad, Janjira, Panhala and Jinji. Then there are number of tactical forts like Vishalgad, Sinhgad, Rajgad, etc.

Raigad, by its very nature, is large daunting fort. Built in 11th century by decedents of Mauryan Empire, it served as anchor to various kingdoms. Its cliffs sore high more than 1200 feet from base. It has abundant fresh water supply. Raigad, like Jinji could be defended for years at a stretch. No one could claim Sahyadri and Konkan as theirs without winning Raigad.

Aurangzeb knew difficulties in winning Raigad by war. So he managed to win it by using insider traitor, Suryaji Pisal. Had Marathas kept Raigad, Aurangzeb’s task would have been much tougher. Marathas lost Raigad early and could not win in back till much later. But they played the remaining two forts, Panhala and Jinji very well. Panhala is strategic because of its location on the confluence of multiple supply chains.  Thus Marathas defended Panhala as long as they could and tried to win it back the earliest when they didn’t have it.

The second component of defensive fort warfare was matching the movements with weather.  Forts are an asset in rest of the year, but are a liability in monsoon as it costs a lot to carry food and supplies up. Also the monsoon in coasts and ghats is severe in nature and no major military movement is possible. Thus Marathas often fought till Monsoon and surrendered the fort just before Monsoon. Before surrendering they burned all the food inside. Thus making it a proposition of loss in every way. Often times Marathas surrendered the fort empty, but later soon won it back filled with food and water. These events demoralized the enemy.

Offensive attacks in terms of evasive raids –

Marathas mostly launched offensive attacks in the region when Mughal army was away. They rarely engaged Mughal army in open fields till later part of the war. If situation seemed dire, they would retreat and disperse and thus conserve most of their men and arms for another day. The rivers Bhima, Krishna , Godavari and the mountains of Sahyadri, divide entire Maharashtra region is in several North- South corridors. When Mughal army traveled South through one corridor, Marathas would travel North through another and launch attacks there. This went on changing gradually and in the end, Maratha forces started engaging Mughals head on.

A noted historian Jadunath Sarkar makes an interesting observation. In his own words, “Aurangzeb won battle after battles, but in the end he lost the war. As the war prolonged, it transformed from war of weapons to war of spirits, and Aurangzeb was never able to break Maratha spirit.”

What Marathas did was an classic example of asymmetric defensive warfare. The statement above by Mr. Sarkar hides one interesting fact about this asymmetric defense. Is it really possible to lose most of the battles and still win the war?

The answer is yes, and explanation is a statistical phenomena called “Simpson’s paradox.”. According to Simpsons paradox, several micro-trends can lead to one conclusion, however a mega-trend combining all the micro-trends can lead to an exact opposite conclusion. Explanation is as follows.

Say two forces go on war, force A with 100 soldiers and force B with 40 soldiers. Now say in every battle between A and B, the following happens.

If A loses, they lose 80% of the soldiers fighting.
If B loses, they only lose 10% of the soldiers fighting.
If A wins, they lose 50% of the solders fighting.
If B wins, they lose only 10% of the soldiers fighting.

In the case above, the ratio of (resource drain of A / resource drain of B ) is higher than (initial number of A soldiers / initial number of B soldiers). So even if A wins battle more than 50% of the time, they will lose their resources faster and, in the end, will lose the war. All B has to do is keep the morale and keep the consistency.

One of the most famous warrior in ancient Indian history seems to agree with the conclusion above. In “Bhishma- perva” of Mahabharata, pitamah Bhishma begins the war-advice to king Yudhisthira with a famous quote –

“The strength of an army is not in its numbers’

For centuries , the mountains and valleys, towns and villages of Deccan had gotten used to being a pawn in the game of power. They changed hands as kingdoms warred with each other. They paid taxes whoever was in a position to extract them. For the most part they remained in a sleepy slumber, just turning and twisting in their bed.
Once in a while they sent their sons to fight in battles without ever asking why exactly the war is being launched. Other times they fought amongst themselves. They were divided, confused and did not have high hopes about their future.
This was the condition of Deccan when Shivaji launched his first expedition of fort Torana in 1645. By the time of his death mere 35 years later, he had transformed Deccan from a sleepy terrain to a thundering volcano.

Finally, here was a man whose vision of future  was shared by a large general audience. An unmistakable characteristic of a modern concept of “nation-state”. Perhaps the most important factor that distinguishes Shivaji’s vision  is that it was “unifying”. His vision went beyond building an army of proud warriors from warrior castes. It included people from all rungs of society sharing a common political idea and ready to defend it at any cost.+++

His vision  went far beyond creating an empire for himself in Maharashtra. It included a building confederacy of states against what he thought were foreign invaders. He was trying to build an Alliance of Hindu kingdoms. He went out of his way to convince Mirza-Raje Jaisingh to leave Aurangzeb. He established relations with the dethroned royal family of Vijaynagar for whom he had tremendous respect. He attempted to unify the sparring Hindu power centers.

And  they responded. Rajputs in Rajasthan,  Nayaks in Karnataka, rulers of Mysore, the royal family of Vijaynagar were of valuable help to Shivaji and later to Marathas. It was certainly a step towards a nation getting its soul back.

While he was creating a political voice for Hindus, Muslims never faced persecution in his rule. Several Muslims served at high posts in his court and army. His personal body guard on his Agra visit was Muslim. His Naval officer, Siddi Hilal was Muslim. Thus Shivaji’s rule was not meant to challenge Islam as a personal religion, but it was a response to Political Islam.

Last but not the least, we must give due respect to one more thing. The seeds of every political revolution can be traced back to a spiritual one and this was no exception. The “Bhakti” movement in Maharashtra that began with 12th Century saint Dnyaneshwar and spearheaded by saint Tukaram (who was contemporary of Shivaji), played a role of social catalyst of immense effect. It created a forum, a pool in society where everyone was welcome.

It’s tempting for a Maharashtrian to claim the root of success of Marathas solely be in Maharashtra. But at the height of it’s peak, only 20% of Shivaji’s kingdom was part of Maharashtra. When Marathas launched northern campaigns in 18th century, it was even more less.

Soldiers in Maratha army came from diverse social and geographical backgrounds including from areas as far away as Kandahar to West and Bengal to East. Shivaji received a lot of support from various rulers and common people from all over India.

Thus limiting Marathas to Maharashtra is mostly a conclusion of a politician.  It must be noted that the roots of Maharashtra culture can be traced to both ancient Karnataka and Northern India. Shivaji himself traced his lineage to Shisodia family of Rajputs. Maharashtrians should not be ashamed to admit that their roots lie elsewhere. In fact they should feel proud that land of Maharashtra is truly a melting pot where Southern and Northern Indian cultures melted to give birth to a new vision of a nation. Shivaji was far more an Indian king than a Maratha king.

Dear readers, here ends the story of an epic war. I hope this saga gives you a sense of realistic hope and a sense of humble pride. All you might be doing today is sitting in a cubicle for the day ,typing on keyboard. But remember that the same blood runs in our fingers that long long time ago displayed unparalleled courage and bravery, the same spirit resides within us that can once soured sky high upon the call of freedom.

by Kedar Soman

References:

“History of Mahrattas” by James Duff –   http://www.archive.org/details/ahistorymahratt05duffgoog

“Shivaji and His Times” by Jadunath Sarkar – http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024056750

“A History Of Maratha People” by Charles Kincaid – http://www.archive.org/details/historyofmaratha02kincuoft

“Background of Maratha Renaissance” by N. K. Behere – http://www.archive.org/details/backgroundofmara035242mbp

“Rise of The Maratha Power” by Mahadev Govind Ranade – http://www.archive.org/details/RiseOfTheMarathapower

“Maratha History” by S R Sharma – http://www.archive.org/details/marathahistory035360mbp

(visit the links to download the full books in PDF form free)

 

‘The fighting spirit of Maratha King Shivaji has always been a source of inspiration for armymen”ExIndian Army Chief General J J Singh

Wonderous mystic, adventurous and intrepid, fortunate, roving
prince, with lovely and magnetic eyes, pleasing countenance,
winsome and polite,magnanimous to fallen foe like Alexander,
keen and a sharp intellect, quick in decision, ambitious conqueror
like Julius Caesar, given to action, resolute and strict
disciplinarian, expert strategist, far-sighted and constructive
statesman, brilliant organizer, who sagaciously countered his
political rivals and antagonists like the Mughals, Turks of Bijapur,
the Portuguese, the English, the Dutch, and the French. Undaunted
by the mighty Mughals, then the greatest power in Asia, Shivaji
fought the Bijapuris and carved out a grand Empire.”

-A.B. de Braganca Pereira says in “Arquivo Portugues Oriental, Vol
III”:

In what far-off country, upon what obscure day I know not now, Seated in the gloom of some
Mahratta mountain-woodO King Shivaji, Lighting thy brow, like a lightning flash,This thought descended,”Into one virtuous rule, this divided broken distracted India,I shall bind.”
-Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore

Kasihki Kala Gayee, Mathura Masid Bhaee; Gar Shivaji Na Hoto,
To Sunati Hot Sabaki!(Kashi has lost its splendour, Mathura has become a mosque;

If Shivaji had not been, All would have been circumcised (converted)

– Kavi Bhushan (c. 1613-1712) was an Indian poet

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Analysis

Learning from Mahatma Gandhi’s mistakes

Mahatma Gandhi is often praised as the man who defeated British imperialism with non-violent agitation. It is still a delicate and unfashionable thing to discuss his mistakes and failures, a criticism hitherto mostly confined to Communist and Hindutva publications. But at this distance in time, we shouldn’t be inhibited by a taboo on criticizing official India’s patron saint.

Gandhiji’s mistakes

Without attempting to approach completeness, we may sum up as Gandhi’s biggest political failures the following events:

(1) Recruiting Indian soldiers for the British war effort in 1914-18 without setting any conditions, in the vain hope that this unilateral gift to Britain would bring about sufficient goodwill in London for conceding to India the status of a self-ruling dominion within the British Empire, on a par with Canada or Australia. While it was already off line for a pacifist to cooperate in such a wasteful war (as contrasted with World War 2, to both sides a kind of holy war where fundamental principles were at stake), Gandhiji’s stance was also a glaring failure of political skill, since he neglected to extract any tangible gains for India in return for the thousands of Indian lives which he sacrificed to British imperial interests.

(2) Committing the mobilisation potential of the freedom movement to the Khil’fat agitation in 1920-22, again a non-negotiated unilateral gift. The Khilafat movement was a tragicomical mistake, aiming at the restoration of the Ottoman Caliphate against which the Arabs had risen in revolt and which the Turks were dissolving, a process completed with the final abolition of the institution of the Caliphate in 1924. It was a purely retrograde and reactionary movement, and more importantly for Indian nationalism, it was an intrinsically anti-nationalist movement pitting specifically Islamic interests against secular and non-Muslim interests. Gandhi made the mistake of hubris by thinking he could reconcile Khilafatism and Indian nationalism, and he also offended his Muslim allies (who didn’t share his commitment to non-violence) by calling off the agitation when it turned violent. The result was even more violence, with massive Hindu-Muslim riots replacing the limited instances of anti-British attacks, just as many level-headed freedom fighters had predicted. Gandhiji failed to take the Khilafat movement seriously whether at the level of principle or of practical politics, and substituted his own imagined and idealized reading of the Khilafat doctrine for reality.

(3) His autocratic decision to call off the mass agitation for complete independence in 1931, imposed upon his mass following and his close lieutenants against their wishes and better judgment, in exchange for a few puny British concessions falling far short of the movement’s demands. His reputation abroad didn’t suffer, but to informed observers, he had thrown away his aura as an idealist leader standing above petty politics; the Pact between Gandhi and Viceroy Lord Irwin amounted to the sacrifice of a high national goal in favour of a petty rise in status for the Congress. Also, every delay in the declaration of Independence gave the emerging separatist forces the time to organize and to strengthen their position.

(4) Taking a confused and wavering position vis-vis India’s involvement in World War 2. His initial refusal to commit India to the war effort could have been justified on grounds of pacifist principle as well as national pride (the Viceroy had committed India without consulting the native leadership), but it was a failure because his followers weren’t following. Indian recruits and business suppliers of the Army eagerly joined hands with the British rulers, thus sidelining Gandhi into political irrelevance. By contrast, the Muslim League greatly improved its bargaining positions by joining the war effort, an effect not counterbalanced by the small Hindu Mahasabha’s similar strategy. The pro-Partition case which the Muslim League advocated was bolstered while Gandhi’s opposition to the imminent Partition was badly weakened. Gandhi was humiliated by his impotence before the degeneration of his “Quit India” agitation into violence and by ultimately having to come around to a collaborationist position himself.

(5) Taking a confused and wavering position vis-vis the Partition plan, including false promises to the Hindus of the designated Pakistani areas to prevent Partition or at least to prevent their violent expulsion. He chose not to use his weapon of a fast unto death to force Mohammed Ali Jinnah into backing down from Partition, a move which cast doubt on the much-touted bravery of all his other fasts “unto death” performed to pressurize more malleable opponents. If acquiescing in the Partition could still be justified as a matter of inevitability, there was no excuse for his insistence on half measures, viz. his rejecting plans for an organized exchange of population, certainly a lesser evil when compared to the bloody religious cleansing that actually took place. Gentle surgeons make stinking wounds.

(6) Refusing to acknowledge that Pakistan had become an enemy state after its invasion of Kashmir, by undertaking a fast unto death in order to force the Indian government to pay Pakistan 55 crore rupees from the British-Indian treasury. Pakistan was entitled to this money, but given its aggression, it would have been normal to set the termination of its aggression, including the withdrawal of its invading troops, as a condition for the payment. Indeed, that would have been a sterling contribution to the cause of enduring peace, saving the lives of the many thousands who fell in subsequent decades because of the festering wound which Kashmir has remained under partial Pakistani occupation. Coming on top of Gandhi’s abandonment of the Hindus trapped in Pakistan in August 1947, it was this pro-Pakistani demand, as well as his use of his choice moral weapon (left unused to save India’s unity or the persecuted Hindus in Pakistan) in the service of an enemy state’s treasury, that angered a few Hindu activists to the point of plotting his murder.

Problems with pacifism

The common denominator in all these costly mistakes was a lack of realism. Gandhi refused to see the realities of human nature; of Islamic doctrine with its ambition of domination; of the modern mentality with its resentment of autocratic impositions; of people’s daily needs making them willing to collaborate with the rulers in exchange for career and business opportunities; of the nationalism of the Hindus who would oppose the partition of their Motherland tooth and nail; of the nature of the Pakistani state as intrinsically anti-India and anti-Hindu.

In most of these cases, Gandhi’s mistake was not his pacifism per se. In the case of his recruiting efforts for World War 1, there wasn’t even any pacifism involved, but loyalty to the Empire whether in peace or in war. The Khilafat pogroms revealed one of the real problems with his pacifism: all while riding a high horse and imposing strict conformity with the pacifist principle, he indirectly provoked far more violence than was in his power to control. Other leaders of the freedom movement, such as Annie Besant and Lala Lajpat Rai, had warned him that he was playing with fire, but he preferred to obey his suprarational “inner voice”.

The fundamental problem with Gandhi’s pacifism, not in the initial stages but when he had become the world-famous leader of India’s freedom movement (1920-47), was his increasing extremism. All sense of proportion had vanished when he advocated non-violence not as a technique of moral pressure by a weaker on a stronger party, but as a form of masochistic surrender. Elsewhere (Elst: Gandhi and Godse, Voice of India, Delhi 2001, p.120-121) I have cited four instances of his advice to the victims of communal violence which is simply breathtaking for its callousness in the face of human suffering. Two more instances follow.

During his prayer meeting on 1 May 1947, he prepared the Hindus and Sikhs for the anticipated massacres of their kind in the upcoming state of Pakistan with these words: “I would tell the Hindus to face death cheerfully if the Muslims are out to kill them. I would be a real sinner if after being stabbed I wished in my last moment that my son should seek revenge. I must die without rancour. (*) You may turn round and ask whether all Hindus and all Sikhs should die. Yes, I would say. Such martyrdom will not be in vain.” (Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.LXXXVII, p.394-5) It is left unexplained what purpose would be served by this senseless and avoidable surrender to murder.

Even when the killing had started, Gandhi refused to take pity on the Hindu victims, much less to point fingers at the Pakistani aggressors. More importantly for the principle of non-violence, he failed to offer them a non-violent technique of countering and dissuading the murderers. Instead, he told the Hindu refugees from Pakistan to go back and die. On 6 August 1947, Gandhiji commented to Congress workers on the incipient communal conflagration in Lahore thus: “I am grieved to learn that people are running away from the West Punjab and I am told that Lahore is being evacuated by the non-Muslims. I must say that this is what it should not be. If you think Lahore is dead or is dying, do not run away from it, but die with what you think is the dying Lahore. (*) When you suffer from fear you die before death comes to you. That is not glorious. I will not feel sorry if I hear that people in the Punjab have died not as cowards but as brave men. (*) I cannot be forced to salute any flag. If in that act I am murdered I would bear no ill will against anyone and would rather pray for better sense for the person or persons who murder me.” (Hindustan Times, 8-8-1947, CWoMG, vol. LXXXIX, p.11).

So, he was dismissing as cowards those who saved their lives fleeing the massacre by a vastly stronger enemy, viz. the Pakistani population and security forces. But is it cowardice to flee a no-win situation, so as to live and perhaps to fight another day? There can be a come-back from exile, not from death. Is it not better to continue life as a non-Lahorite than to cling to one’s location in Lahore even if it has to be as a corpse? Why should staying in a mere location be so superior to staying alive? To be sure, it would have been even better if Hindus could have continued to live with honour in Lahore, but Gandhi himself had refused to use his power in that cause, viz. averting Partition. He probably would have found that, like the butchered or fleeing Hindus, he was no match for the determination of the Muslim League, but at least he could have tried. In the advice he now gave, the whole idea of non-violent struggle got perverted.

Originally, in Gandhi’s struggle for the Indians’ rights in South Africa, non-violent agitation was tried out as a weapon of the weak who wouldn’t stand a chance in an armed confrontation. It was a method to achieve a political goal, and a method which could boast of some successes. In the hands of a capable agitator, it could be victorious. It was designed to snatch victory from the jaws of powerlessness and surrender. By contrast, the “non-violent” surrender to the enemy and to butchery which Gandhi advocated in 1947 had nothing victorious or successful about it.

During the anti-colonial struggle, Gandhi had often said that oppression was only possible with a certain cooperation or complicity from the oppressed people. The genius of the non-violent technique, not applicable in all situations but proven successful in some, was to create a third way between violent confrontation between the oppressed and the oppressor, fatally ending in the defeat of the weak, and the passive resignation of the oppressed in their state of oppression. Rather than surrendering to the superior power of the oppressor, the oppressed were given a method to exercise slow pressure on their oppressor, to wrest concessions from him and to work on his conscience. No such third way was left to the minorities in Pakistan: Gandhi’s only advice to them was to surrender, to become accomplices in their extermination by meekly offering their necks to the executioner’s sword.

My point is not that Gandhi could and should have given them a third way, a non-violent technique that would defeat the perpetrators of Partition and religious cleansing. More realistically, he should have accepted that this was the kind of situation where no such third option was available. Once the sacrifice of a large part of India’s territory to a Muslim state had been conceded, and given previous experiences with Muslim violence against non-Muslims during the time of Gandhi’s own leadership, he should have realized that an exchange of population was the only remaining bloodless solution. The Partition crisis was simply beyond the capacity of Gandhian non-violence to control. If he had had the modesty to face his powerlessness and accept that alternatives to his own preferred solution would have to be tried, many lives could have been saved.

Robust pacifism

It cannot be denied that Gandhian non-violence has a few successes to its credit. But these were achieved under particularly favourable circumstances: the stakes weren’t very high and the opponents weren’t too foreign to Gandhi’s ethical standards. In South Africa, he had to deal with liberal British authorities who weren’t affected too seriously in their power and authority by conceding Gandhi’s demands. Upgrading the status of the small Indian minority from equality with the Blacks to an in-between status approaching that of the Whites made no real difference to the ruling class, so Gandhi’s agitation was rewarded with some concessions. Even in India, the stakes were never really high. Gandhi’s Salt March made the British rescind the Salt Tax, a limited financial price to pay for restoring native acquiescence in British paramountcy, but he never made them concede Independence or even Home Rule with a non-violent agitation. The one time he had started such an agitation, viz. in 1930-31, he himself stopped it in exchange for a few small concessions.

It is simply not true that India’s Independence was the fruit of Gandhian non-violent agitation. He was close to the British in terms of culture and shared ethical values, which is why sometimes he could successfully bargain with them, but even they stood firm against his pressure when their vital interests were at stake. It is only Britain’s bankruptcy due to World War 2 and the emergence of the anti-colonial United States and Soviet Union as the dominant world powers that forced Clement Attlee’s government into decolonising India.

Even then, the trigger events in 1945-47 that demonstrated how the Indian people would not tolerate British rule for much longer, had to do with armed struggle rather than with non-violence: the naval mutiny of Indian troops and the ostentatious nationwide support for the officers of Subhas Bose’s Axis-collaborationist Indian National Army when they stood trial for treason in the Red Fort.

So, non-violence need not be written off as a Quixotic experiment, for it can be an appropriate and successful technique in particular circumstances; but it has its limitations. In many serious confrontations, it is simply better, and on balance more just as well as more bloodless, to observe an “economy of violence”: using a small amount of armed force, or even only the threat of armed force, in order to avoid a larger and bloodier armed confrontation. This is the principle of “peace through strength” followed by most modern governments with standing armies. It was applied, for example, in the containment of Communism: though relatively minor wars between Communist and anti-Communist forces were fought in several Third World countries, both the feared Communist world conquest and the equally feared World War 3 with its anticipated nuclear holocaust were averted.

The ethical framework limiting the use of force to a minimum is known as “just war theory”, developed by European thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius between the 13th and 18th century, but in essence already present in the Mahabharata as well. Thus, waging war can be a just enterprise when it is done in self-defence, when all non-violent means of achieving the just objective have been tried, when non-combatants are respected as such, when the means used are in proportion to the objective aimed for, etc.

One of the less well-known criteria for just warfare which deserves to be mentioned here in the light of Gandhi’s advice to the Hindus in Pakistan is that there should be a reasonable chance of success. No matter how just your cause, it is wrong to commit your community to a course of action that only promises to be suicidal. Of course, once a group of soldiers is trapped in a situation from which the only exit is an honourable death, fighting on may be the best course remaining, but whenever possible, such suicide should be avoided. This criterion is just as valid in non-armed as in armed struggle: it was wrong to make the Hindus stay among their Pakistani persecutors when this course of action had no chance of saving lives nor even of achieving certain political objectives.

As the Buddha, Aristotle, Confucius and other ethical guides already taught, virtue is a middle term between two extremes. In this case, we have to sail between the two extremes of blindness to human fellow-feeling and blindness to strategic ground realities. It is wrong to say that might makes right and that anything goes when it comes to achieving victory, no matter what amount of suffering is inflicted on the enemy, on bystanders or even on one’s own camp. It is equally wrong to strike a high moral posture which haughtily disregards, and hence refuses to contain or subdue, the potential for violence in human confrontations and the real pain it causes. In between these two extremes, the mature and virtuous attitude is one which desires and maintains peace but is able and prepared to fight the aggressor.

Limiting the use of force to a minimum is generally agreed to be the correct position. In this case, disagreeing with Gandhi is not an instance of Communist or Hindu-chauvinist extremism, but of the accumulated wisdom of civilized humanity. Excluding the use of force entirely, by contrast, may simply whet the aggressor’s appetite and provoke far more violence than the achievable minimum.

This is a mistake which an overenthusiastic and inexperienced beginner can forgivably make, but in an experienced leader like Mahatma Gandhi during his time at the head of the freedom movement, it was a serious failure of judgment. The silver lining in the massacres which his mistakes provoked, is that they have reminded us of the eternal wisdom of “the golden mean”, the need for a balanced policy vis–vis the ever-present challenge of violence and aggression. It has been known all along, and it is crystal-clear once more, that we should avoid both extremes, Jinnah’s self-righteousness and Gandhi’s sentimentalism.

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Analysis

Akbaruddin Owaisi’s : 15 minutes of Fame hiding Historical Shame

Akbaruddin OwaisiAmidst the recent furore over the comments made by Akbarudddin Owaisi in Hyderabad it once again brought to the fore the residual prejudice and hatred lingering under the surface of otherwise educated and modern people.

His boasting of ‘Muslim’ fighting prowess against the much hated Hindu ‘other’  before cheering crowds of his supporters and his subsequent brazen defiance of the law had made headlines across India and beyond.

But what great fighting ability is he talking about? What residue of the utterly discredited ‘martial race’ theory in which certain races were classified by the British as martial and others as non-martial was he relying upon?

The state of Hyderabad was formed at a time amidst the collapse of the Mughal Empire. The relentless 27 year struggle of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb against the Hindus and the Marathas in particular had absorbed the principal Mughal forces and grandees in the southern parts of India for decades at an appalling cost to human lives and property. The devastating attacks and raids of Maratha warriors sapped the strength of the Mughal armies who eventually retreated to the North in confusion and defeat.

The founder of the Hyderabad state was known as the Nizam who harboured dreams of creating his own empire. With a generous chunk of the Mughal treasury and army he established himself at the city of Hyderabad in the south, at first ostensibly a feudatory of the Mughals and then as an independent state. The rise of the warrior Maratha leader Baji Rao caused the Maratha forces to pour in an irresistible wave into north India and in great alarm the sly Nizam knowing that he was unable to fight with his Hindu adversaries clandestinely supported the Maratha northward expansion. Eventually however he was brought to bay by Baji Rao and suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Bhopal in 1738 following which he became a virtual tributary to the Maratha Empire.

Subsequent events also do not reflect favourably upon the Nizam and his descendant. Attempts to contend with his Maratha enemies led to further disgraceful defeats in the Battle of Udgir (1758)  – the Battle of Rakhsabavan (1763) and finally in a climactic defeat of the Battle of Kharda (1795)  – Unable to contend or to escape from his Hindu enemies the so called ‘martial’ warriors of the Mughals clung to the rising British forces for protection. As the climactic years of the 18th century concluded amidst a long and protracted war between the British and the Marathas in 1803-1805 and then in 1818 the British emerged victorious and the Nizam for his cowardice and loyalty rewarded with his rule over Hyderabad confirmed.

And thus the Nizam was finally safe – to rule and tyrannise over his state under the protection of the British Empire as their oldest and most valued servant.

An Indian Army motor column is cheered by villagers on its way to Naldurg, Hyderabad.The dawn of independence saw the wave of freedom roll over the nation but leave the ‘martial’ Muslims of Hyderabad untouched. In an incredible display of stupidity he declared his ascension to Pakistan despite being located in the deep south of India. After decades of defeats at the hands of his Hindu neighbours and a hundred years of utter passiveness against the British he formed his armed forces to repress and kill the Hindu population of his state. He formed a radical and murderous militia known as the Razakars to terrorise and slaughter the unarmed Hindus who began to rise against his tyrannous state. Again the forerunners of Owaisi talked of their fighting prowess and devastating consequences to the Hindus if the struggle continued.

It is of course a matter of history that the intervention of the Indian army in 1948 and the collapse of the Hyderabad forces within 5 days after a tirade of rhetoric in line with the recent spewing of Mr Owaisi of dire consequences and the fighting abilities of the Muslims – it has become a laughing stock of military capitulation and humiliation

In line with the above we can understand that after making his disgusting speech Owaisi in line with his forerunners of the Hyderabad state fled to London for sanctuary – the long and humiliating history of the Hyderabad Nizams in which they failed to defeat a single significant enemy and yet still beat their chests boasting of their bravery could ask for no more.

 

 

 

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